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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5526  
INFO RUCNCLS/ALL SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIA COLLECTIVE  
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE  
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6138  
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 3594  
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2080  
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 4974  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC  
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 4646  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC  
RUEIDN/DNI WASHINGTON DC  
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI  
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 6904  
RUCPDOG/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC  
RHHJJPI/PACOM IDHS HONOLULU HI  
RHMFISS/HQ USSOCOM MACDILL AFB FL  
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC  
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC

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IN

SUBJECT: INDIA REQUESTS FORMAL TERRORISM WATCH LIST EXCHANGE

Classified By: PolCouns Ted Osius, Reason 1.5 (B,D)

¶1. (S) This is an ACTION request for the Department S/CT and SCA. Please see paragraph 4.

¶2. (S) Summary: Indian MEA Counter-Terrorism Cell Director I M Pandey passed a request to Poloff that the U.S. and India sign an agreement to create a formal and continuous channel to exchange terrorism watch lists, including "no fly" lists, FBI wanted lists, and other intelligence-based terrorist lists. Pandey indicated that the lists should include more information than simply names and birth dates, since South Asian names are often very similar. End Summary.

¶3. (S) Poloff met with Indian MEA Counter-Terrorism Cell Director I M Pandey on May 8th to discuss follow-up steps to the Counter-Terrorism Joint Working Group. Pandey said that he had been working to establish a point of contact for U.S. officials to follow up on arrests of terrorism suspects reported in the newspaper. He said, however, that this may be the wrong avenue to help the U.S. ensure that terrorists do not receive U.S. visas. Instead, he said the Ministry of Home Affairs was asking for a formal bilateral agreement to exchange terrorism watch lists on an ongoing basis. These would include "no fly" lists, FBI wanted lists, and additional lists derived for intelligence purposes. After all, he explained, some of the people who appear in the newspaper may be innocent, so it is important that we exchange information about the real terrorists. He was also concerned that some South Asian names are very common, such as Singh and Patel, leading to confusion about who is really on the list. He suggested that the lists should include more information than simply names and dates of birth, if it is available, to avoid this kind of confusion.

¶4. (S) ACTION REQUEST: Post requests guidance on how to respond to Pandey's request, particularly whether this kind of information, including names at a SECRET level, can be shared with the GOI on a continuous basis. Can the information be gathered into a single database? Legatt comments that Homeland Security Presidential Directive/Hspd-6

may apply if India is formally included in the list of certain foreign governments that should receive this information.

15. (S) Comment: India has a wealth of information about Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTO) Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish Muhammad, including names of terrorists involved in the groups at an operational level, so India's lists may be of high intelligence value for the United States. Further these lists may be of high value for the Visa's Viper program at Embassies across South Asia. As with any exchange with India, we have to watch that this formal mechanism does not become an excuse for the Ministry of Home Affairs to stall in providing reciprocal information. The steps necessary to negotiate this agreement may, themselves, prove to be a long and drawn out process. End Comment.  
PYATT